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A METHOD FOR SOLVING CONFLICT
PROBLEMS--TORTS
Russell J. Weintraub*t
Of all choice-of-law rules, the one which United States courts have
most widely accepted and universally applied is the rule governing
liability for tort by the "law of the place of wrong"' or, more precisely,
the place of impact.2 It is inconceivable that a single choice-of-law
* The author gratefully acknowledges the able research assistance of Gary L. Anderson,
class of 1962, and Richard P. Glovka, class of 1963.
t RussE.L J. WEImN AuB, Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1950, New
York University; LL.B. 1953, Harvard Law School. Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School,
1955-57. Co-author, The Iowa Law of Workmen's Compensation; Contemporary Values and
the Responsibility of the College; Supplement, Moore's Federal Practice (1960-61). Con-
tributor to legal and other periodicals.
I Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934).
2 Where the defendant acts in one jurisdiction and the harm to the plaintiff occurs in
another jurisdiction, it is the law of the place of harm which is applied. Hunter v. Derby
Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940) (unwholesome canned food); Maryland v. Eis
Automotive Corp., 145 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1956) (negligently manufactured brake);
Western Newspaper Union v. Woodward, 133 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (fraudulent
misrepresentation); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (El). Wash. 1955)
(negligent failure to warn of danger); Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937 (Wi). Mo. 1953) (conspiracy in restraint of trade); Mann
v. Policyholders' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W.2d 853 (1952) (negligent failure
to act on policy application); El Paso & Northwestern Ry. v. McComas, 36 Tex. Civ. App.
170, 81 S.W. 760 (Ct. Civ. App. 1904) (improperly loaded lumber); Dallas v. Whitney,
118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936) (blasting). See also Conn. Valley Lumber Co. v. Me.
Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 553, 103 AUt. 263 (1918) (defendant damages bridge in two jurisdic-
tions, damage within each jurisdiction governed by that jurisdiction's law).
An apparent exception has developed in cases involving harm to the incidents of marriage
where the law of the place where the defendant acted, rather than the law of the marital
domicile has been applied. Albert v. McGrath, 278 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (alienation
of affections); Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956) (alienation of affections);
Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) (alienation
of affections). For such holdings on the issue of loss of consortium, see cases cited notes 23,
25 infra.
Occasionally, other courts have departed from the standard rule, applying the law of the
place where the defendant acted. Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1959)
(wrongful interference with contract); Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479(10th Cir. 1950) (court follows parties in regarding recovery as controlled by law of place
where airplane negligently repaired); Moore v. Pywell, 29 App. D.C. 312 (D.C. Cir. 1907)
(negligent filling of prescription); Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932)
(erection of dam flooding plaintiff's land).
Probably the two best known cases applying the law of the place where the defendant
acted rather than the law of the place where the plaintiff was injured are Levy v. Daniels'
U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928) (bailor responsibility
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rule could serve adequately over the vast range of tort problems-
intentional torts, negligence, liability without fault, capacity to sue,
measure of damages, distribution of damages, survival of actions, and
more, much more. The result of applying a single rule in so many different
contexts has often been irrational, and worse, unjust, decisions. Spor-
adically, a court has departed from the rigid standard rule to reach what
it sensed was a just result. Too often, however, the "reasons" articulated
by courts for such departures have been so patently irrational and
arbitrary as to invite widespread criticism of a proper result and make
the choice between disease and cure a difficult one. It is the purpose of
this article to suggest a method for solving conflict problems in the torts
area which, it is hoped, will achieve just results logically, predictably, and
consistently.'
I. IDENTIFY AND ELIMINATE SPURIOUS CONFLICTS
The first step in the solution of a choice-of-law problem in the torts
area should be the identification and elimination of spurious conflicts.
A spurious conflict is present when two or more jurisdictions, having
some contact with the parties or the occurrence, have tort rules pointing
to different results, but, upon analysis of the purposes underlying the
putatively relevant and divergent rules, it becomes apparent that one rule
and one rule only is rationally applicable to the case in issue. If, for
example, one contact state has a rationally applicable rule making the
defendant liable and no other contact state has a rule eliminating liability,
the purposes of which would be advanced by applying the liability-
insulating rule to the case at bar, there is no conflict. The defendant
should be liable. Conversely, if one state having a contact with the
parties or the occurrence has a rationally applicable rule insulating the
defendant from liability and no other contact state would advance the
statute), and Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (dram shop
act). These two cases are further discussed in this article at text accompanying notes 31
and 44 respectively.
The Federal Torts Claims Act provides for tort liability of the federal government "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1958). This has been interpreted to mean -the whole law of the place "where
the act or omission occurred," including its conflict of laws rules. Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). Similar language is contained in the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958): "Whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas ...the
personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages . . . ." See Noel
v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.NJ. 1958) (negligent servicing in New York,
Venezuelan airplane crashes on high seas).
3 The author's general theories of choice of law are stated in "A Method for Solving
Conflict Problems," 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 573 (1960). These general theories were applied to
contract problems in "The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws-A Critique," 46 Iowa L. Rev. 713 (1961). This article applies these theories to
torts.
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purposes of its liability-producing rule by applying that rule to the case,
the defendant should not be liable.
A. The Place of Impact
The classic example of a spurious conflict is the one involving capacity
of the wife to sue the husband in tort. The husband and wife are
domiciled in State F, a state which permits the wife to sue the husband
for personal injuries caused by the husband's negligence. While a
passenger in an automobile driven by the husband in State X, the wife
is injured as a result of the husband's negligence. Under X law, a wife
may not sue her husband in tort. The wife brings suit against the husband
in State F. There is no true conflict. F, as the wife's domicile, will advance
at least some of the purposes underlying its rule permitting suit-com-
pensation to the wife to prevent her from becoming a public charge and
to ease her and the family's financial burden.4 In the event that the wife
has received medical treatment in F, recovery will also provide a pool
for the compensation of medical creditors in F. What policies might
underlie State X's incapacity rule? On the surface, X might be seeking
to preserve marital harmony by preventing husband and wife from be-
coming adversaries in a public trial. This, of course, is a naive appraisal.
Almost invariably the real defendant is the husband's liability insurer.
Both husband and wife desire recovery in order to help meet the medical
and other costs of the wife's injury.5 But even assuming a marital harmony
policy, X is not the forum and has no interest in providing protection
for F marriages when F itself does not think protection necessary.,
Paradoxically, a more realistic policy supporting the X rule might be the
prevention of a collusive suit, husband and wife combining to get as
much from the insurer as possible. A policy in X against collusive
husband-wife suits might carry the day if X were the forum, but it can
hardly prevail when X's only contact is as place of impact and F is both
forum and marital domicile. Moreover, a complete interdicting of suit
does not seem as rationally expressive of a policy against collusion as
might rules concerning presumptions, burden of proof, and quantum of
evidence required.7 Despite all this, the place of wrong rule has repeatedly
resulted in F's denying recovery to the wife.8
4 The burden is shifted from the family because the husband is only the nominal de-
fendant. It is his liability insurer who will pay. This is discussed below.
5 See Hancock, "The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital Immunity
for Tort in Conflict of Laws," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237, 244 n.36 (1962); Comment, 44
Yale L.J. 1233, 1239 (1935).
6 Hancock, supra note 5, at 244.
7 See Ford, "Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law
and Reason Versus -the Restatement," 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397, 400 (1954).
8 E.g., Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Bissonnette v. Bissonnette,
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The landmark case departing from the standard rule and permitting
the wife to recover under such circumstances is Haumsckild v. Continental
Cas. CoY While a husband and wife domiciled in Wisconsin were
driving in California, the wife was injured by the husband's negligence.
Overruling a long line of Wisconsin cases, the most notorious of which
is Buckeye v. Buckeye, 0 the court permitted the wife to sue her
husband" and his liability insurer under Wisconsin law, although under
California law, California being a community property state, a wife
may not maintain such a suit.' The result, however, was not based upon
an analysis of the policies underlying the respective Wisconsin and
California rules. The court chose the law of the domicile rather than that
of the place of impact because it characterized the question as one of
family law rather than tort law.
Is there any objection to reaching a desirable result by simply changing
the characterization label from "tort" to "family law"? After all, a good
many commentators had urged such a result and suggested a change
in characterization as a means of achieving it.3 There are, however,
many things wrong with the Haumschild methodology. Such characteriza-
tion legerdemain is arbitrary and unconvincing. 4 It upsets a pattern of
decisions based on logic, albeit sterile logic, without providing a logical
145 Conn. 733, 142 A.2d 527 (1958); Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d
509 (1955); Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960) (suit against husband's
estate); Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 AtI. 508 (1934); Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438,
46 N.E.2d 509 (1943) (forum closed-married pendente lite); Howard v. Howard, 200
N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931). Cf. Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951)
(mother's suit against unemancipated minor).
The marital domicile has more readily given effect to its own policies when the situation
is reversed, the marital domicile forbidding suit, the place of impact permitting it. When
refusing to apply the law of the place of impact, the marital domicile typically avoids a
decision on the merits, simply refusing a forum. See Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669,
286 N.W. 120 (1939); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 NJ. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
9 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). Also permitting such suits, see Morin v.
Letourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959) (law of state of impact interpreted as
barring remedy but not right-married after accident); Pittman v. Deiter, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d
360 (Phila. County 1957); cf. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955)
(unemancipated minors permitted to recover against parent under law of domicile) ; Fowlkes
v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 183 S.E. 210 (1935) (law of forum-domicile permits
suit of unemancipated minor against parent).
10 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
11 The marriage had been annulled after the accident, but the decision does not rest on
this ground.
12 Emery v. Emery, supra note 9, held that the capacity of a minor child to sue a
parent and whether or not a parent's action is community property are governed, thus
causing a husband's negligence to be imputed to the wife, by the law of the domicile. The
majority in Haumschild did not rest on this development in California law, although the
concurring opinion stressed it.
13 See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 346 (1942) ("capacity
to sue") ; Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 206 (2d ed. 1951) ("domestic relations") ;
Ford, supra note 7, at 424 ("status"); Kelso, "Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of
Laws: Current Dilemmas," 33 Ind. LJ. 297, 308 (1958) ("family relations").
14 Cf. Shavelson, "Survival of Tort Actions in the Conflict of Laws: A New Direction?"
42 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 809 n.22 (1954) ("procedural" or "substantive").
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basis for the prediction of future decisions."5 This is not to suggest that
every conflicts case must be decided ad hoc or that there should not be
articulated generalizations in the form of choice-of-law rules. Such
generalizations are valid, however, only insofar as the reasoning leading
to such generalizations is valid. Choice-of-law rules are useful only
as shorthand expressions of a policy-centered analysis such as that
demonstrated above. Their shorthand nature should be recognized and
they should be abandoned when they no longer advance the policies
on which they are based. The danger of Haumschild's articulating a
choice-of-law rule in lieu of, instead of as a result of, such a policy-
centered analysis is that the rule will be applied in a deceptively analogous
situation in which it will produce results as unjust and irrational as those
it displaced. 16
This danger has been fully realized in the case of Haynie v. Hanson.17
A married couple, domiciled in Illinois, were in Wisconsin when the
wife was injured as the result of a collision between an automobile driven
by her husband and one driven by a Mr. Hanson. Mr. Hanson held
liability insurance issued by Heritage Mutual Insurance Company. At
all relevant times, Mr. Hanson was a resident of Wisconsin and Heritage
Mutual was a Wisconsin corporation. 8 The wife brought suit in Wis-
consin against both Hanson and his liability insurer. The defendants
sought to implead the husband's liability insurer alleging that the
husband's insurer would be liable for contribution because of the
husband's negligence. A dismissal of the cross-complaint was affirmed.' 9
The husband had no underlying liability on which to base contribution
because husband and wife were domiciled in Illinois. Under Illinois
law the wife does not have capacity to sue her husband in tort. Haums-
child had decided that the law of the marital domicile governs a wife's
capacity to sue.
Perhaps, however, it was not quite that simple. Wisconsin, as domicile
of the defendants, certainly had no interest in preventing them from ob-
taining contribution. The possible policies underlying the Illinois in-
capacity rule, prevention of domestic discord and avoidance of collusive
suits, were not rationally applicable when the wife was not suing her
husband. In thus producing a spurious conflict, the Haynie decision
denied Wisconsin's strong interest without advancing any interest of
Illinois.
-15 See Leflar, "Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 461 (1953).
16 See Currie, "Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws," 13 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 732
n.58 (1961) ; Hancock, supra note 5, at 253-54.
17 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
18 Brief for Appellant, p. 11, Haynie v. Hanson, supra note 17.
19 Accord, Pirc v. Kortebein, 186 F. Supp. 621 (D. Wis. 1960).
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In terms of a policy-centered analysis, the commentators' clamor for
a change in the choice-of-law rule governing a wife's capacity to sue her
husband in tort, as haltingly and imperfectly recognized in Haumschild,
is all part of a more fundamental and more pervasive proposition. The
place of impact, qua place of impact, has no interest in insulating the
defendant from liability, unless it can rationally be argued under the
circumstances that the defendant has acted in reliance on that place's
insulating rule. Such a reliance argument will almost invariably be
untenable when directed at rules governing liability for unintentional
torts, excluding, of course, such purely directory local rules as speed
limits, rules of the road, and the like.
There is one unrecognized situation which is a potential breeder of
more spurious conflicts than perhaps any other. This is the "guest statute"
situation. The conditions here for producing spurious conflicts by applying
the liability-insulating rule of the place of impact are just about perfect.
First, slightly more than half of the states require that more than ordinary
negligence be chargeable to the host in order for a guest automobile
passenger to recover against the host for injuries suffered as a passenger. °
Second, it is very likely that the host and guest will be domiciled in the
same state. The chances of the following situation happening are there-
fore quite good. Host and guest are domiciled in State F. State F permits
injured guests to recover against their hosts by showing that the injuries are
due to the ordinary negligence of the host. Host and guest depart together
for a short trip into State X. While in State X, the host's negligent
driving causes injury to his guest. State X has a "guest statute" preventing
recovery under such circumstances unless the guest can show "gross" or
"wanton" negligence on the part of the host. The guest brings suit against
the host in State F. It would make no sense to apply X's guest statute.
Two possible policies might underlie the X statute. One, naive in view
of the great likelihood that the real defendant is the host's liability
insurer, is the policy of preventing the guest from manifesting such
ingratitude toward his host. Two, paradoxically and more realistically,
is the prevention of a collusive suit, host aiding guest against the host's
liability insurer. 1 Neither of these policies is rationally applicable to
a suit in F between an F host and an F guest. Yet repeatedly the place-
20 Twenty-nine states, either by statute or case development fall into this category. For
lists see Ehrenzweig, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enter-
prise Liability under 'Foreseeable and Insurable Laws' 69 Yale L.J. 595, 599 n.30 (1960);
Notes, 34 Ind. L.J. 338 n.2 (1959); 3 Wyo. L.. 225 n.2 (1949); 47 Iowa L. Rev. 1049 n.6(1962).
21 See Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 25, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (Sup. Ct.
2d Dep't 1959); Ehrenzweig, supra note 20, at 599.
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of-wrong rule has resulted in the application of the foreign guest
statute in just such a situation.2
Sestito v. Knop is another example of a spurious conflict spawned by
the failure to recognize that the place of impact has no interest in insulat-
ing the defendant from liability. In Sestito, a husband whose marital
domicile was in Michigan, was injured in an automobile collision in
Wisconsin and rendered impotent. His wife brought an action in a federal
court sitting in Wisconsin for loss of consortium. Defendants were the
driver of the other automobile and his liability insurer. The other driver
was domiciled in Illinois.' Wisconsin did not recognize such an action,
but Michigan did. Applying Wisconsin law, as that of the place of wrong,
the trial court dismissed the complaint and the dismissal was affirmed
on appeal. The wife ingeniously argued that the wrong was an injury to
the marital relation and that this occurred in Michigan, the marital
domicile. The court, however, rejected this argument ruling that the
place of the wrong was where the husband had been injured, this being
the last event necessary to create liability 5 The plaintiff did not urge,
nor did the court note, that not only plaintiff's domicile, but also
Illinois, the domicile of the other driver, permitted wives actions for
loss of consortium.2 6 If the defendant driver's home state would not
have shielded him from liability, Wisconsin, as place of impact, had no
22 E.g., Sharp v. Johnson, 248 Minn. 518, 80 N.W.2d 650 (1957); Blount v. Blount,
125 So. 2d 66 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Naphtali v. Lafazan, supra note 21; Estate of Bed-
narowicz v. Vetrone, 400 Pa. 385, 162 A.2d 687 (1960); Fyksen v. Fyksen, 267 Wis. 542,
66 N.W.2d 150 (1954).
Sometimes the day is saved by a finding that the guest's evidence meets the sterner
requirements of the foreign statute: Douglas v. Wood, 254 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953);
Smith v. Northern Ins. Co., 120 So. 2d 309 (Orleans Ct. App., La. 1960); Wilcox v.
Swenson, 324 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1959); McAllister v. Maltais, 102 N.H. 245, 154 A.2d
456 (1959); Dodrill v. Young, 143 W. Va. 429, 102 S.E.2d 724 (1958). Or the court may
find that the plaintiff was not a "guest" within the meaning of the foreign statute: Burt
v. Richardson, 251 Minn. 335, 87 N.W.2d 833 (1958); Oehler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Wis. 2d
656, 87 N.W.2d 289 (1958). In Smoot v. Fischer, 248 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) the
crash was on a bridge between Illinois and Missouri. The court avoided the Illinois guest
statute by holding that Missouri had "concurrent jurisdiction." In Rodney v. Staman, 371
Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952), the court resorted to more heroic measures. Although the court
held the foreign guest statute applicable, it decided that the question of whether or not
the evidence as a whole was sufficient to take the case to the jury would be determined
by the forum's law, and thus was able to affirm a judgment for the guest's estate, the guest
incidentally being the wife of the host. There was a sharp dissent pointing out that the
case never would have gotten to the jury in the guest statute state. The dissent declared
"we have no concern with the wisdom of the Ohio statute or the propriety of the decisions
construing it." Id. at 15, 89 A.2d at 320. If the marital domicile of host and guest is not
concerned, then who should be?
23 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961).
24 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, appendix, p. 2, Sestito v. Knop, supra note 23.
25 Accord, Jordan v. States Marine Corp., 257 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1958); McVickers v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 194 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1961). But cf. Lister v. McAnulty, [1944]
Can. Sup. Ct. 317, [19441 3 D.L.R. 673 (law of marital domicile applied to prevent
husband's recovery for loss of consortium, though law of place of accident would permit
recovery).
206 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
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interest in so doing. It is true that the defendant insurer was incorporated
in Pennsylvania and licensed to do business in Wisconsin,2 7 and neither
of these states permitted a wife to recover for loss of consortium .2
But neither of these states could have a legitimate interest in insulating
the insurer from a liability which would attach under the laws of both
the plaintiff's and the insured's domiciles.
One situation in which it might be expected that a policy-centered
analysis of choice of law would be commonplace is in the interpretation
of statutes creating civil liability, when the plaintiff seeks to apply such
a statute to a harm he has suffered outside the enacting state. If the
statute does not expressly cover the choice-of-law problem, and very few
do, the standard process of statutory construction would demand an
inquiry into the policies underlying the statute.2 9 Although such an
analysis has been undertaken by a few courts, particularly the United
States Supreme Court, and although there appears to be a trend in this
direction, the record is still very disappointing.3 °
On the credit side of the ledger is Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel.31 The
defendant operated a bar in Minnesota. In violation of Minnesota law,
one Sorrenson was served liquor at defendant's bar while intoxicated. As
a result of this illegal sale, Sorrenson overturned his automobile while
driving in Wisconsin. Plaintiff, a passenger, was injured and brought
suit against the bar owners under the Minnesota dram shop act imposing
civil liability upon liquor sellers under such circumstances. Wisconsin,
the place of impact, would not have imposed civil liability.32 Wisconsin,
however, had no interest in insulating the Minnesota bartender from
liability. Moreover, the purposes underlying the Minnesota statute, com-
pensation to those injured and control of the activities of Minnesota
27 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, appendix, p. 2, Sestito v. Knop, supra note 23.
28 As to Pennsylvania law, see Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
29 But see Cheatham & Reese, "Choice of the Applicable Law," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959,
965 (1952): "[I]t is often hard to refine the purpose behind a statute to the point where
it becomes helpful in deciding a choice of law case."
30 See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959): "The amount
and type of recovery which a foreign seaman may receive from his foreign employer while
sailing on a foreign ship should not depend on the wholly fortuitous circumstances of the
place of injury." (affirming dismissal of seaman's Jones Act and general maritime claims
against his employer); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (Jones Act): "We
are simply dealing with a problem of statutory construction. . . ."; Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281-82 (1952) (Lanham Act): "Resolution of the jurisdictional issue
in this case therefore depends on construction of exercised congressional power, not the
limitations upon that power itself." But cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (Sherman Act): "The foregoing considerations would lead in case
of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and
effect -to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."
31 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
32 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 176,35 (1957) (applicable only if sale to minor or, after notice to
desist, to a habitual drunkard). Section 176.26 did make it a crime to sell to "any person
intoxicated or bordering on intoxication."
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bartenders, were fully applicable. The sale had been in Minnesota and
the plaintiff was a Minnesota citizen. The court saw this and held the
Minnesota statute applicable.33
It is interesting to compare Schmidt with the Illinois case, Eldridge
v. Don Beachcomber, Inc. 4 As in Schmidt, the plaintiff had been injured
out of state by a drunk who had been served liquor in Illinois. The
court, however, refused to permit the plaintiff to recover under the
Illinois dram shop act.35  ldridge, however, is distinguishable from Schmidt.
In Eldridge the plaintiff was not an Illinois resident. Moreover, the
Illinois act, unlike the Minnesota statute, required no illegal act for the
bar owner to be liable. All that was necessary was sale of liquor which
caused "in whole or in part ' 36 the intoxication of the person causing the
damage. Thus, it could be argued that since the purpose of the Illinois
act was not to control the conduct of Illinois bartenders, and since the
plaintiff was not an Illinois citizen, the reasons justifying extraterritorial
application of the Minnesota statute in Schmidt were absent and the
Eldridge result was correct.3 7 There is, however, a contrary argument.
First, although the Illinois statute required no illegal act on the part of
the bartender as a condition precedent to the imposition of civil liability,
the presence of a civil liability statute would be likely to cause Illinois
bar owners to avoid acts likely to lead to dangerously intoxicated patrons.
Moreover, a likely rationale of the Illinois dram shop act is one similar
to the rationale of workmen's compensation-placing upon an industry,
as a cost of doing business, " the risks of injury fairly attributable to its
methods of operation. 9 It is perhaps too callous a view to say that Illinois
is "interested" in having the social costs of the Illinois tavern industry
borne by that industry only when risks of such costs, created in Illinois,
are realized within Illinois. So callous, perhaps, as to raise serious,
though largely unexplored, problems under the "privileges and immunities"
33 Cf. Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D. Conn. 1961) (Connecticut dram shop act
permits recovery against owner of Connecticut bar illegally serving liquor causing fatal
injuries to New York resident in New York).
34 342 Ill. App. 158, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950), leave to appeal denied, 346 Ill. App. xiv
(1952).
35 Cf. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 903 (1960) (Illinois statute does not apply when collision in Mfichigan, nor Afichigan
statute when liquor served in Illinois, although court bases civil liability on violation of
Illinois criminal statute); Goodwin v. Young, 34 Hun. 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884) (New
York statute not applicable when damage in Vermont).
36 I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, § 135 (1961). Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 45 N.E.2d 622
(1942) (contribution to intoxication, no matter how slight, sufficient).
37 Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1351, 1352 (1958).
38 The cost is placed upon the industry in the first instance. Whether such cost is
eventually absorbed or passed on by the industry is dependent upon the same complex
economic and social factors which determine to what extent other costs of doing business
are absorbed or passed on.
39 See note, 4 Vill. L. Rev. 575, 577 (1959).
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provision of article IV, section 2 and the "privileges or immunities" and
"equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, especially the last.40 The problem is particularly
acute when dealing with legislation such as a dram shop act instead of,
for example, workmen's compensation. In dealing with workmen's com-
pensation, there is a greater likelihood that, if denied compensation under
one state's statute because he is a nonresident, the injured person will
have compensation available under the statute of a state with which he
is more closely identified. 41 Moreover, the territorial reasoning of
Eldridge has resulted in denial of compensation for injury out of state
even to Illinois citizens injured by Illinois drunks who were served liquor
in Illinois bars.4
Thus, a state's statute or common law rule, which would provide
recovery for residents of that state, should also provide recovery for
nonresidents of that state, unless to do so would officiously interfere
with the policy of the victim's home state. For example, suppose the
victim, a resident of State X, is employed by an X corporation and per-
forms his duties mainly in X, although he does occasionally work in
State Y. The employer has qualified as a self-insurer under X's workmen's
compensation system, but has failed to apply or qualify as required
by Y's workmen's compensation statute. The victim is injured while
working in Y. Y would permit an employee of an uninsured employer
to sue his employer at common law, escaping from the limited and defi-
nite liability of the workmen's compensation system. Y should not
permit this victim to do so, and perhaps an attempt to do so should be
held a denial of full faith and credit to the "exclusive remedy" provision
in X's workmen's compensation statute.4 There would not be a similar
objection to Y's making compensation available under its own workman's
compensation act. On the other extreme, recovery under local law
should, and hopefully must, be available to a nonresident if withholding
recovery would irrationally discriminate against him. Local denial is
40 In the final analysis, the answer will probably turn upon the reasonableness of the
classification for the purpose at hand. See Currie & Schreter, "Unconstitutional Discrimina-
tion in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1960); Currie &
Schreter, "Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Im-
munities," 69 Yale L.J. 1323, 1348 (1960); Kramer, "Interests and Policy Clashes in
Conflict of Law," 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 523, 536 (1959); cf. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252
U.S. 553, 559 (1920) (borrowing statute's exclusion of local citizen not "arbitrary or vexa-
tious discrimination against non-residents").
41 But cf. Currie & Schreter, supra note 40, 69 Yale L.J. at 1366 (local dram shop act
should not be available to non-resident if bar owner out-of-state corporation doing business
locally).
42 Butler v. Wittiand, 18 Ill. App. 2d 578, 153 N.E.2d 106 (1958).
43 See Weintraub, "Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's
Choice of Law," 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 478 (1959).
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likely to be most irrational and most discriminatory when it means as a
practical matter that the nonresident will have no recovery available to
him any place.
A case which is similar in result to Schmidt and in method to Haums-
child is Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co.44 A Connecticut
statute made lessors of motor vehicles liable for harm done by the vehicle
while leased. An automobile which defendant-lessor had rented to the
driver in Connecticut caused harm in Massachusetts. Massachusetts had
no lessor liability statute. The court held the Connecticut statute appli-
cable, thus reaching a correct result. There was no conflict. Connecti-
cut's interests in controlling the conduct of Connecticut lessors, or per-
haps more realistically, in imposing the risks created by automobile
renting on the lessors as a cost of doing business, and in compensating
the victim, were fully applicable despite the fortuitous impact elsewhere.
Massachusetts certainly had no interest in insulating the Connecticut
lessor from liability.45 The holding, however, was put upon the fantastic
ground that the problem was one of contract, not tort, liability, the
plaintiff being the third party beneficiary of a contract of bailment made
in Connecticut, impliedly incorporating the Connecticut statute.46 It is
small wonder that the Levy rationale has proven unacceptable to another
court. What is unfortunate is that the result should fall with the
reasoning.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Schmidt's reasonable and
just result is the holding in Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Carroll.48 A train
owned by an Alabama corporation was negligently inspected in Alabama
by the corporation's employees. As a result, a coupling parted after the
train had crossed the state line into Mississippi. The plaintiff, also em-
ployed by the corporation and a citizen of Alabama, was injured. Alabama
had an employer's liability statute, but Mississippi retained the liability-
insulating "fellow servant" rule. Instead of interpreting the Alabama
44 108 Conn. 333, 143 Ati. 163 (1938).
45 Cf. J.H.C. Morris, "The Proper Law of a Tort," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 890 (1951).
But see Cheatham & Reese, supra note 29, at 967: "[T]his purpose [incentive to lessor to
choose customers with care] would have been substantially achieved even if the scope of
the statute's application had been confined to Connecticut accidents."
40 Cf. Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 138 A.2d 705 (1958) (Connecticut statute
applicable to injury in Massachusetts even if contract of bailment not made in Connecticut,
where vehicle was garaged and extensively operated in Connecticut).
47 Hanseman v. Hamilton, 176 F. Supp. 371, 374 (D. Colo. 1959) (lessor's liability under
Colorado statute inapplicable to injury in Ohio): "The characterization in the Levy case
does not accord with the better view."
In a somewhat comparable situation, a state's owner's liability statute has been held
inapplicable although the bailment took place within the state and the victim is a citizen
of the state. Selles v. Smith, 4 N.Y.2d 412, 151 N.E.2d 838, 176 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1958);
Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 183 (1936).
48 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
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statute in light of its purposes4 9 of providing compensation for injured
employees and encouraging safe practices by employers, both of which
were applicable here, the court rested a holding of inapplicability on the
place-of-impact rule. Significantly, the Alabama statute was subsequently
amended to cover out-of-state injury,5" but too late to help Mr. Carroll.
Grant v. McAuliffe51 is an example of a rightful refusal to allow the
law of the place of impact to insulate the defendant from liability, but
reached by untenable reasoning. Two automobiles, driven by California
citizens, collided in Arizona. One driver died and subsequently plaintiffs,
occupants of the other automobile, brought an action in California
against his estate. By California law, but not by Arizona law, such an
action survived the death of the tortfeasor. The California court, depart-
ing from the traditional path,52 permitted recovery. The result was the
only one rationally possible. California, as common domicile and forum,
had an interest in compensating the plaintiffs and in distributing the de-
fendant's estate so as to accomplish this. Arizona, being neither the
decedent's domicile, nor the site of administration, had no interest in
insulating the estate and the decedent's heirs from liability." As in
Haumsckild, however, this rational and just result was achieved by the
seemingly arbitrary process of label-switching. The characterization of
the survival problem was changed from "tort," first to "procedure" and
then to "administration of estates." It is not surprising that the Grant
reasoning failed to convince another state's highest court considering the
problem as one of first impression. The Grant result, however, was dis-
carded with its reasoning.54 Even more significantly, the eminent, per-
haps pre-eminent, jurist who wrote the Grant opinion has since said of it:
It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case is my
own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be
against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would make
no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was less
deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of choice
of law.55
49 See Morris, supra note 45, at 888.
50 Ala. Code Ann. § 7540 (1928) (if contract of employment made in Alabama).
51 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
52 Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 AUt. 691
(1928); Dalton v. McLean, 137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940).
The only significant departure from the standard rule before Grant had been an occasional
refusal of a forum with no survival statute to entertain an action based on such a statute
at the place of impact. Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Herzog v. Stern, 264
N.Y. 379, 191 N.E.23 (1934). Contra, Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959).
53 See Currie, "Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 221, 239 (1958); Shavelson, "Survival of Tort Actions in the
Conflict of Laws: A New Direction?" 42 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 811 (1954); Comment, 44 Yale
LJ. 1233, 1238 (1935).
54 Allen v. Nessler, 247 Minn. 230, 76 N.W.2d 793 (1956).
55 R. Traynor, "Is this Conflict Really Necessary?" 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 670 n.35
(1959).
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In a later opinion, in another area of the conflict of laws, however,
Justice Traynor does not allow "the brooding background" to deter him
from a straight-forward analysis of the policies underlying apparently
conflicting state laws.56
In all of the foregoing situations, and in many more,'7 spurious con-
flicts can be identified and eliminated by simply recognizing, as suggested
above, that the place of impact as such has no interest in insulating the
defendant from liability, absent a reasonable basis for the defendant's
arguing that he acted in reliance on the protection of that place's rule.
B. Interests of Contact States
Having seen what interest the place of impact does not have, it might
be well to indicate briefly what interests it does have and also to indicate
the probable interests of other states having a contact with the parties
or with the occurrence in a tort case.
The place of impact will have an interest in compensating the injured
party. Compensation will prevent the victim from becoming a public
charge within the state and vill provide a pool from which local medical
and other creditors, who have furnished services to the victim as a result
of his injury, may be compensated."' Of course, it may be that in an
individual case the facts are such that these interests of the place of
impact are reduced to the vanishing point. For example, the victim may
leave the state of impact immediately, go to another state where he is
domiciled, and receive medical treatment there. Although, even under
such circumstances, the state of impact may retain sufficient interest
in providing compensation to prevent our saying that it has no interest
and that the application of its law will be unreasonable,"9 the fact that
50 Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
57 See, e.g., De Bono v. Bittner, 13 Misc. 2d 333, 178 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1958), aff'd mem., 10 App. Div. 2d 556, 196 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't 1960)
(whether release of joint tortfeasor validly reserved rights against defendant-law of place
of impact shields defendant from liability under law of domicile of all parties); Builders
Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 '(1951) (no contribution between joint
tortfeasors, applying law of place of impact contrary to law of forum and defendant's
domicile); Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942) (whether covenant
not to sue executed for one tortfeasor bars action against joint tortfeasor); cf. Victor v.
Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (apply rule of place of
impact yielding less than one-sixth amount of damages available under rule of common
domicile).
58 See Currie, "The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case," 27 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1, 71 (1959); Hancock, "Three Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem: The
Classificatory, the Functional and the Result-Selective," in XXth Century Comparative and
Conflicts Law 365, 371 (1961).
59 Cf. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (Missouri employee of sub-contractor,
injured in Arkansas, permitted to bring tort suit in Arkansas against general contractor
contrary to provisions of Missouri workmen's compensation act): "Arkansas therefore
has a legitimate interest in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though in this
case Carroll's injury may have cast no burden on her or on her institutions."
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its interest in compensation is thus reduced should certainly be consid-
ered in reconciling any true conflict that might exist.6" The interest of
the place of impact in providing compensation is similarly reduced if
the victim is killed and recovery is for wrongful death. The proceeds
of such recovery, at least when there are close relatives surviving,6 are
not subject to the claims of creditors.6 2 One matter over which it is clear
that the place of impact as such has no interest is in the manner of
distributing the proceeds of a wrongful death recovery. Any conflict in
regard to such distribution between the law of the place of impact and
the law of the domicile of the decedent and his next of kin is spurious.
The law of the domicile should control. The rigid standard rule has,
however, under such circumstances, consistently resulted in the applica-
tion of the law of the place of impact.63
In addition to its interest in compensating the victim, the place of
impact has an interest in shaping its tort rules so as to discourage con-
duct which will result in harmful impacts within its borders. Such an
interest in controlling the tortfeasor's conduct is strongest when dealing
with intentional torts and diminishes to the vanishing point when dealing
with the ordinary automobile negligence case, if one excludes such purely
directory rules as speed limits. This is because the conduct of the negli-
gent tortfeasor, particularly the "accident prone" highway menace, can-
not realistically be shaped by rules governing civil liability.64 The place
where the defendant acts, if this is different from the place of impact,
has similar interest in controlling his conduct."5
The defendant's domicile, or in the case of a corporation, its place of
incorporation, or place of doing business, has an interest in controlling
the defendant's conduct. It also has an interest in insulating the de-
fendant from liability.6 This latter interest may be illustrated by cases
And see discussion below of place of impact's interest in controlling the tortfeasor's
conduct.
60 See Section II, infra.
61 See, e.g., Iowa Code § 635.9 (1962):
When a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of
as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, but if the deceased
leaves a husband, wife, child, or parent, it shall not be liable for the payment of debts.
62 See Currie, "The Constitution and the Choice of Law," 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 15 (1958).
The fact that it is unnecessary to protect local creditors has made it possible for foreign
administrators to sue locally on the wrongful death claim without obtaining local appoint-
ment. Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 291, 51 N.W.2d 466 (1952); Howard v. Pulver, 329
Mich. 415, 45 N.W.2d 530 (1951) ; Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 Ati. 395 (1929).
63 Workman v. Hargadon, 345 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1961); Matter of Winikoff's Estate, 116
N.Y.S.2d 262 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1952); Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900 (N.D.
1954); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 393, comment c (1934).
64 See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 11.4 (1956).
65 See Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold & Reese, Cases on Conflict of Laws 441 (4th ed.
1957); Ehrenzweig, "The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason
Versus the Restatement," 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1951). But see note 2, supra.
66 See Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891) (New York
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involving charitable immunity. The place of impact has no interest in
insulating a charity incorporated elsewhere from tort liability, if the
place of impact has no substantial contacts with the charity. This is
true, for example, if the charity is merely conducting an outing or tour
in a state which has a rule of charitable immunity and the state in which
it is incorporated or generally conducts its activities has no immunity
rule. The charity should not receive the benefit of the immunity rule for
injuries suffered in the state where the short tour or outing is being held.67
On the other hand, if the charity is generally engaged in beneficial
activities within a state, that state has an interest in applying its im-
munity rule to the charity, even though the charity is incorporated
elsewhere."'
The forum, qua forum, has an interest in preserving the integrity and
economy of its judicial process. It may protect this interest by closing
its forum and refusing to render a judgment on the merits if, because of
the absence of forum contacts and the presence of foreign contacts, the
forum is a seriously inconvenient site for litigation and an appropriate
site is available to the plaintiff.69 Similar forum-closing action may be
taken if adjudication at the forum will amount to prosecuting the de-
fendant for a crime which he has committed in another jurisdiction," or
citizen killed in Pennsylvania while riding on train of New York railroad-New York limit
on damages applied). But cf. Tuffarella v. Erie R.R., 10 App. Div. 2d 525, 203 N.Y.S.2d
468 (2d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 1040, 170 N.E.2d 232, 206
N.Y.S.2d 820 (1960), motion for leave to appeal denied, 12 App. Div. 2d 491, 209 N.Y.S.2d 274
(2d Dep't 1960), motion to amend answer denied, 27 Misc. 2d 638, 211 N.Y.S.2d 351
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961), motion for summary judgment granted, 226 N.Y.S.2d 87
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962) (one joint tortfeasor permitted to implead another under
law of place of impact despite fact that law of domicile or place of incorporation of all
parties would not permit impleading); Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink [1947] K.B. 1 (absolute
privilege provided by law of domicile not applicable to official act in England of one
official of Czech government in exile affecting another such official, but English qualified
privilege prevents liability).
67 But see Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955); Kaufman
v. American Youth Hostels, 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1958),
modified in other respects, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
68 See Menardi v. Thea. Jones Evangelistic Ass'n, 154 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1957)
(dismiss suit brought where charity transacting business, although no immunity rule at
place of impact); Allison v. Mennonite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Pa. 1954)
(dictum). But cf. Heinemann v. Jewish Agricultural Soc'y, 178 Misc. 897, 37 N.Y.S.2d 354
(Sup. Ct. Chautauqua County 1942), aff'd mem., 266 App. Div. 907, 43 N.Y.S.2d 746 (4th
Dep't 1943), motion for leave to appeal denied, 266 App. Div. 941, 46 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th
Dep't 1943), motion for leave to appeal granted, 291 N.Y. 828, 51 N.E.2d 698 (1943) (in
suit at place of incorporation decline to apply immunity rule of State in which charity
running training farm).
69 See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 117e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). There
might well be included under this forum non conveniens doctrine, two other supposedly
distinct bases for declining jurisdiction: (1) refusal to adjudicate concerning the "internal
affairs" of a foreign corporation. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Frenkil, 155 Md. 189, 141 Ati. 528
(1928) ; (2) refusal to take jurisdiction when adjudication at the forum will place an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. See e.g., Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265
U.S. 101 (1924). See 1 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 133, 143-44 (1959).
70 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 103, 120 N.E. 198 (1918): "The purpose
must be, not reparation to one aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice."
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if application of relevant foreign law will "violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."71 Rarely, if ever, should
this last reason be applicable to the law of a sister state.72 The forum,
qua forum, however, has no interest in affecting the result on the merits
by displacing logically applicable foreign law, and it should exert every
effort to avoid doing so.7 The so-called "procedural" category, now
including many rules which have high potential for determining the out-
come, 4 should be reserved for situations in which the difficulty of ascer-
taining and applying the foreign rule outweighs any small likelihood that
the result may be changed by applying the forum's law.7 1
An example of a forum's protection of the integrity of its procedures
may be the refusals by state courts to permit suits under the "direct
action" statutes of sister states."6  The forum may feel that permitting
the liability insurer to be named and joined as a defendant under such a
statute is too likely to result in a perversion of justice. This may be
naive in view of the known ubiquitousness of liability insurance. But
71 Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202.
72 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 21-22 (3d ed. 1949). But cf. Gordon v. Parker, 83
F. Supp. 40, 43 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) (permitting
action for alienation of affections though abolished by Pennsylvania, the marital domicile):
"Pennsylvania was concerned with not having Pennsylvania courts hear this sordid type of
controversy. . . . That is, Pennsylvania has spoken qua possible forum . . . but not qua
state of matrimonial domicile."
73 But see Comment, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1497, 1503 (1961) (interest of forum in integrity
of its system of administering justice permits use of its outcome-determinative rules of
evidence).
74 Statute of limitations: Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955);
Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952); Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329
S.W.2d 426 (1959); Barrett v. Boston & Me. R.R., 178 A.2d 291 (N.H. 1962); Conn.
Valley Lumber Co. v. Me. Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 553, 103 At. 263 (1918); McDaniel v.
Mulvihill, 196 Tenn. 41, 263 S.W.2d 759 (1953). The problems created by holding statutes of
limitation to be procedural have been alleviated somewhat by two devices: (1) "borrowing
statutes" which make a foreign statute of limitations applicable to bar an action at the
forum. See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960), remanded for
reconsideration of another matter, 365 U.S. 293 (1961), former opinion adhered to, 290
F.2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961); (2) the "specificity test" which
treats certain statutes of limitations as substantive. See Bengston v. Nesheim, 259 F.2d
566 (9th Cir. 1958); Maryland v. Eis Automotive Corp., 145 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1956).
Burden of proof: Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919). Contra, O'Leary
v. Ill. Terminal R.R., 299 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1957); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Int'l Ry., 252 N.Y. 127,
169 N.E. 112 (1929) (forum's rule on burden of proof not used when applying foreign
comparative negligence statute).
Miscellaneous: Chasse v. Albert, 147 Conn. 680, 166 A.2d 148 (1960) (res ipsa);
Leebove v. Rovin, 363 Mich. 569, 111 N.W.2d 104 (1961) (whether sufficient evidence to
go to jury).
75 See Cook, "Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Yale L.J. 333,
344 (1933) ; cf. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651-52, (1953).
76 Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946); McArthur
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939); Morton v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 151 N.E.2d 881, 176 N.YS.2d 329 (1958); Penny v. Powell, 347 S.W.2d
601 (Texas Sup. Ct. 1961). Contra, Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956) (purporting to apply New York law
now established to the contrary).
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assuming such an attitude exists, should it be invoked to deny a forum to
a local citizen who has been injured abroad in a jurisdiction having a
direct action statute," when there is a foreign defendant insured by a
foreign insurance company? The issue should be put to and faced by
the court squarely, rather than in terms of whether the direct action
statute is "procedural" or "substantive." Perhaps it might be put like
this: the X statute affords this court an opportunity to provide a forum
in this state for a resident of this state seeking to recover damages for
personal injuries. That such a forum may be provided here without
running afoul of any constitutional prohibitions is beyond debate. 77
Equally beyond debate is the fact that this court may deny such a forum
if it wishes to. Before denial, however, this court should ask itself "what
rational purpose would be served by sending our citizen elsewhere to
bring his suit?"17
If the forum has an interest other than as forum, if it has a rationally
applicable rule of its own which conflicts with the rationally applicable
rule of another jurisdiction, it should face up to the conflict, resolve it
one way or another, and render a result on the merits. It should not
elect the ostrich-like solution of closing its doors to the problem. 79
The domicile of the plaintiff has an interest in providing compensation
for him. This will prevent him from becoming a public charge and help
assure compensation for medical creditors who are likely to have at-
tended the injured plaintiff at his domicile. 0 The plaintiff's domicile
has no interest in insulating the defendant from liability. Failure to
recognize this, resulted in a California court's denying a forum to a
California citizen suing a Hawaiian defendant for damage caused in
Hawaii by the defendant's child. Refusal was on the ground of sub-
stantial conflict between Hawaiian law holding a parent liable for torts
of the child and California law denying such liability.8 '
It is emphasized that a check list of probable or usual interests, such
77 See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Atchison, T.
& S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 US. 55 (1909).
78 See Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 379-80 (1960) (plaintiff's domicile has no interest in
preventing direct action).
79 But see the following examples of refusing a forum for suit against a local citizen:
Gaines v. Poindexter, 155 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. La. 1957) (alienation of affections); Kircher
v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939) (wife suing husband); Koplik v. C.P.
Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, .141 A.2d 34 (1958) (wife suing husband); Mertz v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 NME.2d 597 (1936) (wife suing husband); Herzog v. Stem, 264 N.Y. 379,
191 N.E. 23, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597 (1934) (survival).
80 See Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold, & Reese, supra note 65. For a discussion of a
state's "interest" in compensating an injured person who is not a citizen of the state see
text accompanying notes 35-43 supra.
81 Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1927); cf.
Le Forest v. Tolnan, 117 Mass. 109 (1875) (defendant's domicile applies law of plaintiff's
domicile to absolve defendant from liability for dog bite).
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as the foregoing, is not a suitable substitute for focusing on the specific
rules in supposed conflict and analyzing these rules in terms of their
underlying policies in an attempt to identify and eliminate spurious
conflicts.
C. Exceptional Situations
This policy-centered analysis for avoiding spurious conflicts concerns
itself only with conflicts policies. There may, at times, be other distinct
policies at play in a given case which are weightier than the conflicts
policies and which should produce a result different from that which
would have been reached if only the conflicts policies had been consid-
ered. This is true, for example, when dealing with the multiple state
torts of invasion of privacy 82 and libel."2 If the defendant has published
the same damaging material in many jurisdictions, there is no good
reason, so far as purely conflicts policies are concerned, why each juris-
diction should not be free to determine for itself the consequences of
the harm caused within it, some granting recovery, some denying it, some
applying liberal damages rules, some restricting damages. But to permit
this when publication has been made in literally dozens of jurisdictions8 4
would result in an unintelligible babble of rules if an attempt were made
to try all of the resulting transitory causes of action in one suit, or in
multiple litigation at much cost to the parties and harassment of the
defendant. For these reasons, it may be desirable to select some one
jurisdiction, such as the plaintiff's domicile, or, if the plaintiff has suffered
most of his harm in some other jurisdiction, that jurisdiction," to provide
82 Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956); Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal.
1958); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co, 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 232 F.2d
369 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135
N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954) (also libel).
83 Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Simon, 299 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.
1962); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948) ;
Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Brewster v. Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565 (D. Mass. 1960); Dale Sys., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116
F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Dale Sys., Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
84 See Schumann v. Loew's Inc., supra note 82 (61 jurisdictions); Bernstein v. Nat'l
Broadcasting Co., supra note 82 (28 jurisdictions) ; O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra
note 83 (38 jurisdictions).
85 See Strickler v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co, supra note 82 (right of privacy-law of
domicile); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., supra note 82 (right of privacy-law of
domicile or where plaintiff has most of his contacts); Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co.,
130 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (libel-place of plaintiff's principal reputation); Dale
Sys., Inc. v. Time, Inc., supra note 83 (libel-law of domicile); Stumberg, "'The Place of
the Wrong' and the Conflict of Laws," 34 Wash. L. Rev. 388, 393 (1959) ("place where
the plaintiff is likely to incur the most harm"). But cf. Association for Preservation of
Freedom of Choice v. Simon, supra note 83 (libel-law of place of first publication);
Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., supra note 82 (libel-a flexible rule suitable to
the facts); Dale Sys., Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., supra note 83 (libel-law of place
where there is a grouping of the dominant contacts).
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the rules to govern liability for the damage done everywhere. This may
be desirable for reasons of economy of judicial administration, when
otherwise the result might be justly criticized for creating a spurious
conflict. For instance, if the law of the plaintiff's domicile is selected, it
may insulate the defendant from liability, failing to advance any sub-
stantive interest of the domicile, and at the same time conflict with the
interests of other states who would hold the defendant liable for what he
has there published. Granting all this, one should never lose sight of the
possibility that such overriding policies of judicial economy may not
exist in all cases of interstate publication. The defendant may have
published in only two or three states, or the facts may be such that it is
clear that a cause of action exists under the law of only one or a very
few states.86 If so, there is no rational purpose to be served in giving the
defendant the benefit of a rule of the plaintiff's domicile which would
relieve the defendant from liability existing under the laws of other
states having an interest in discouraging such publications within their
borders.
In the area of workmen's compensation there again is no choice-of-law
problem in the classic sense of preventing forum-shopping and choosing
the single most appropriate law to govern. In dispensing workmen's
compensation, every state having sufficient contact with the employer-
employee relationship to make it desirable that the employee be pro-
tected under its law and reasonable to require the employer to insure in
the state should feel free to provide protection under its workmen's com-
pensation law. The local administrative machinery required for enforce-
ment of a state's compensation statute will preclude the confusion of
claims under different laws being litigated in the same proceeding. Any
subsequent award under the statute of another state will take account
of the first award. The only conflicts problem in the workmen's com-
pensation area is the articulating of the circumstances under which a
forum does have sufficient connection with the employer-employee rela-
tionship to make it reasonable and desirable to apply its workmen's
compensation statute to claims arising from that relationship. 7 These
factors make workmen's compensation cases dangerously misleading
bases upon which to build general conclusions about choice-of-law
problems."
86 See Donahue v. Warner Bros., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) (heirs' action for invasion of
right of privacy existed, if at all, only under Utah law).
87 For an attempt to state such circumstances see Weintraub, "Conflict of Laws," in The
Iowa Law of Workmen's Compensation 137, 144-45 (1960).
88 But see Leflar, Conflict of Laws 257 (1959) ; Currie, "The Verdict of Quiescent Years:
Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 258, 274 (1961).
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D. Applying the Known Rule
One of the major difficulties with rigid, territorially oriented choice-
of-law rules of the standard form, such as place of impact, is that such a
rule, strictly followed, may lead to grave difficulties and inconveniences
in the administration of justice. For example, suppose, as happened in
Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,8 9 an American citizen is injured by the
servants of an American corporation and sues the corporation in an
American court. The only difficulty is that the place of impact is Saudi
Arabia and neither the plaintiff, nor apparently anyone else for that
matter, knows the applicable Saudi-Arabian rule. What is the plaintiff
to do? After all, the law that must be applied is that of the place of
impact. The answer in Walton was a directed verdict for the defendant,
despite the fact that the laws of the plaintiff's domicile and the de-
fendant's place of incorporation were known and would have provided
recovery. Surely, there must have been a better way than this. 0
Such a better way is a correlate of the policy-centered analysis advo-
cated above. Once a logically applicable rule, the underlying purposes
of which will be advanced by applying to it the case at hand, is known
to the forum, it is the rule to be applied-unless and until one of the
parties who wishes to displace it can demonstrate that it conflicts with
another logically applicable rule which, under all the circumstances,
should be preferred over the first.9 Of course, the logically applicable
rule that is known to the forum will usually be the forum's rule. It
might even be argued that the forum's rule, as the one most familiar to
local lawyers and judges, should be applied even though the forum has
no interest in the litigation, until it is shown that an interested jurisdic-
tion has a different rule. This is certainly a far more questionable pro-
cedure than applying the law of an interested forum. In any event, there
should be no such rebuttable presumption in favor of the law of a
neutral forum if the forum's rule is an anachronistic lag in the develop-
ment of that state's law which would tend to concentrate rather than
distribute losses; for example, a rule that actions for personal injury do
not survive the death of the tortfeasor.
Actually, despite theoretical commitment to the place-of-impact rule,
89 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
90 See also Pando v. Jasper, 133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956) (error to instruct under
guest statute of sister state which was not pleaded, although forum had similar statute).91 See Cheatham & Reese, "Choice of the Applicable Law," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 964
(1952); Currie, "On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 964,
1003 (1958); Ehrenzweig, "The Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws-Exception or Rule?" 32
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 13, 14, 18 (1959). But see Childres. "Toward the Proper Law of the
Tort," 40 Texas L. Rev. 336, 338 (1962): "[T~he call back to the lex fori as the basic rule
is surely a retrograde step."
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many courts have, either directly or through presumptions as to the
nature of foreign law, applied the forum law in default of proof of the
law at the place of impact.2
E. When the Interstate Nature of the Occurrence Changes Intrastate
Results
It is fundamental, of course, that in order for an interstate transaction
to create a problem in the conflict of laws there must be some conflict in
the laws of the contact states. If all contact states would reach identical
results for identical reasons, if the occurrence had been intrastate in
character, there is no rational basis upon which a different result can be
reached because a state line has been crossed.93 Despite the axiomatic
quality of such a statement, the traditional, rigid, territorially oriented
choice-of-law rules have, at times, under such circumstances, trapped
courts into generating the most spurious conflicts of all.
This is precisely what happened in Nelson V. Eckert.4 Arkansas citi-
zens were riding in the same automobile in Texas when an accident killed
the driver and all passengers. The administrators of the passengers sued
the administrator of the driver in Arkansas more than two years after the
mishap. If the accident had been an intrastate occurrence within either
Arkansas or Texas, the action would have been barred because both
states had two year statutes of limitations governing suits for wrongful
death. Yet the court, using the traditional substantive-procedural di-
chotomy, held that the action was not barred. The Arkansas statute of
limitations was substantive, being part of the Arkansas wrongful death
act, and therefore did not apply if the impact was in another state. The
Texas two year statute was not part of the Texas death act, was there-
fore procedural, and did not apply to an action brought in Arkansas.
92 Estate of Gallagher v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 122 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 894
(1956) (forum law applied when plaintiff gave no notice of his intention to rely on foreign
law); Craven v. Brighton Mills, Inc., 87 Ga. App. 126, 73 S.E.2d 248 (1952) (since foreign
law neither pleaded nor proved, charge should have been under forum law); Otey v.
Midland Valley R.R., 108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921) (forum law applicable until
shown different rule at place of impact); Selles v. Smith, 4 N.Y.2d 412, 151 N.E.2d 838,
176 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1958) (absent showing to contrary, presume sister state's common law
same as forum's); Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936) (same pre-
sumption); Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st
Dep't 1942) (same presumption); Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366
P.2d 989 (1961) (forum law applied absent showing foreign law different); Harper v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 500, 111 N.W.2d 480 (1961) (failure to plead and
prove foreign law raises presumption that it is the same as the forum's); cf. White v.
Borders, 104 Ga. App. 746, 123 S.E.2d 170 (1961) (common law of forum controls rather
than common law of place of impact).
93 See Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold, & Reese, supra note 65, at 450 n.1; Harper,
"Torts, Contracts, Property, Status, Characterization, and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Colum.
L. Rev. 440, 444 n.14 (1959); M. Traynor, "Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained
and Enlightened Forum," 49 Calif. L. Rev. 845, 856 (1961).
94 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959).
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The same thing nearly happened in Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't
Store.9 5 Plaintiffs had been injured in Michigan by a drunk who had
been served liquor in Illinois. Suit was brought against the owner of
the bar which had served the liquor. Both Michigan and Illinois had
dram shop acts which, in a similar intrastate transaction, would have
provided recovery. But the court held that neither statute was appli-
cable. The Illinois act did not apply to injuries in Michigan and the
Michigan act did not apply to liquor served in Illinois. The court was
able to save the situation by the heroic device of finding liability under
Michigan common law based on a violation of an Illinois criminal statute.
In a simliar situation, another federal court avoided the need for ac-
complishing by such an indirect method the only rational result. It dis-
missed any suggestion that the two similar dram shop acts created a
conflict problem by noting that in view of the similarity it was "difficult
to see how the harmony between different states which is the fundamental
basis for the whole doctrine of conflict of laws could be adversely
affected."96
A similar, but distinct and less easily identified, spurious conflict
arises when the two contact states would reach the same result in an
intrastate transaction, but would reach this result for different reasons,
at least one of which is applicable to the interstate transaction in issue.
Victor v. Sperry97 is an example. A California citizen was injured in
Mexico while a passenger in an automobile being driven with the consent
of its California owner. In California, the owner would have been liable
under that State's owner's responsibility statute,9 8 the driver -having
been negligent. Under Mexican law, the owner would have been sub-
jected to absolute liability. The court held the owner not liable because
the Mexican absolute liability rule was contrary to California public
policy. The court never even mentioned California's owner's liability
statute. Yet Mexico as place of impact and California as domicile both
had an interest in compensating the plaintiff.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacek99 presents a slight variation on this theme.
A New Jersey wife was injured in New York while a passenger in an
automobile driven by her husband. The wife sued her husband in a
95 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
96 Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Conn. 1961). But cf. Leebove v. Rovin,
363 Mich. 569, 111 N.W.2d 104 (1961) (court engages in lengthy conflicts discussion while
continually indicating in footnotes that there is no substantial difference between the laws
of the two States involved).
97 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (4th Dist. 1958).
98 Cal. Vehicle Code § 17150. This assumes that the guest could meet the requirements
of the California guest statute, not mentioned by the court. Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158.
99 156 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1957).
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federal court sitting in New Jersey. There would have been no liability
under New Jersey law because under that law a wife may not sue her
husband in tort. Under New York law there was no such disability, but
the husband's insurance policy would not be deemed to insure against
liability to a spouse unless the policy expressly so provided. The hus-
band's policy contained no such provision. Despite all this, there was
a summary judgment against the insurer when it sought a declaratory
judgment determining its rights and duties under the policy. The New
York insurance statute00 was held inapplicable to a policy issued in
New Jersey. 0 1
It is possible for an intrastate result to be changed rationally by the
crossing of a state line. This would occur when the two contact states
would reach the same result, but for different reasons, neither of which
is applicable to the interstate transaction. For example, suppose a wife,
whose marital domicile is in State F, was injured by her husband's negli-
gent driving in State X. The wife brings suit against her husband in F.
X has a rule preventing wives from suing their husbands in tort, but this
rule is not rationally applicable when X is neither marital domicile nor
forum. The cause of the collision was the husband's violation of an X
rule of the road, although he would have been driving properly by F
rules. The F rules of the road, however, are not applicable in X. Though
there would have been no liability if the occurrence had been an intra-
state one within either F or X, there should now be liability. 02
II. PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR RESOLVING TRUE CONFLICTS
If, upon analysis of the policies underlying the different laws of two
jurisdictions, it is decided that there is a true conflict, that each has a
legitimate interest in having its own rule applied, there may still be a
rational basis for resolving the conflict. Such a rational solution will be
far more satisfactory than giving up the moment a true conflict appears
and applying the law of the forum. It is emphasized that speaking of
seeking a rational solution to a true conflict is not the same as suggesting
that the interests of the two jurisdictions be "weighed." It is suggested,
however, that in viewing the entire matter at issue with circumspection
and common sense, a rational solution to a true conflict, one which
should be satisfactory to either contact state, will very often suggest
100 N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3).
101 Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958) has established that
the New Jersey incapacity rule would be applied to a New Jersey wife injured in New York.
102 See Harper, "Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays," 56 Yale L.J. 1155, 1162-63 (1947) (suggesting another
situation in which there might be an "interstate tort" although no "intrastate tort").
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itself. Although such a process must of necessity be flexible and although
circumspection and common sense cannot be blueprinted, it is the pur-
pose of this section to suggest some significant criteria for the rational
solution of true torts conflict problems.
A. The General Direction for Resolution of a True Torts Conflict
It is desirable that choice-of-law rules be formulated with careful
attention to the substantive policies in the area of law in which the
choice-of-law rules are to operate. The choice-of-law rules should, so
far as possible, further such underlying policies, and advance rather
than retard clearly discernible trends in each area of the law."03 More-
over, such a trend is likely to be shared generally by most states, although
individual rules of law may or may not manifest the trend. Thus a
choice-of-law rule keyed to such a trend will be focusing on a broad
common policy as a basis for reconciling a conflict of two narrow rules
of law.
As is readily apparent from a perusal of the cases cited in this article,
the vast bulk of torts conflicts cases concern automobile, or, in this air
age, airplane accidents, in which recovery is sought on the basis of negli-
gence on the part of the owner or driver of such a vehicle. In this field
of negligence or accident law, the trend has been markedly toward dis-
tribution rather than concentration of losses, through the device of
liability insurance. 04 Although the area of absolute liability is expand-
ing in tort law,10 5 most of accident law today is still based nominally on
the negligence-fault concept. Cases which get to the jury, however, usu-
ally result in plaintiffs' verdicts and the substantive rules have shown a
continual development in such a manner as to keep fewer and fewer
cases from the jury. 00
It is beyond the scope of this article to appraise in detail the moral or
social desirability of such a development. To assume, however, that it'is
the "negligent" driver or owner who pays the judgment in an accident
case out of his own pocket, is to live in a never-never land. The issue is
103 See Totterman, "Functional Bases of the Rule Locus Regit Actum in English Conflict
Rules," 2 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 27,33 (1953).
104 See Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold, & Reese, supra note 65 ; Ehrenzweig, Negligence
Without Fault 28 (1951); Green, Judge and Jury 241 (1930); 1 Harper & James, Torts
xliv," vol. 2, 784, 1194, 1345 [hereinafter cited as Harper & James]; Ehrenzweig, "Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws," 69 Yale L.J. 595, 598 (1960); Katzenbach, "Conflicts
on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International
Law," 65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1121 (1956); R. Keeton, "Creative Continuity in the Law of
Torts," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 463, 466 (1962).
105 1 Harper & James xliv.
106 1 Harper & James xliii-iv, vol. 2, 895, 1371; Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for
the Traffic Victim 3-4 (1954). But see Green, Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance 101
(1958).
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not whether the defendant should pay but whether the loss should be
distributed or remain concentrated and the inexorable trend has been in
favor of distribution. It is submitted that this is reasonable and just and
that it is from such a trend that conflicts analysis, certainly in the negli-
gence area and probably in other tort areas as well, should map its
general direction. Whether in fact this tempting basis for resolution of
a true conflict should be utilized in an individual case will depend upon
factors in the particular fact situation pointing to or away from liability
and distribution of the loss. Examples of such factors are indicated in
the four following sections.
B. Unfair Surprise
One of the strongest factors weighing against resolution of a conflict
in favor of liability would be unfair surprise to the defendant. There
are two levels of argument available here. On one level, surprise to the
defendant should be an element to be considered and perhaps, if suffi-
ciently strong, be controlling in the resolution of a conflict between a rule
which would confer liability and one which would deny liability. On the
second level, there would be surprise to the defendant so extreme and so
outrageous, if liability were found, that there would be a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
On the first level, surprise as an element to be weighed in resolving a
true conflict, there are several points which should be kept in mind. If,
as in most tort conflict cases, recovery is sought for negligence, it is
very unlikely that any reasonable surprise argument can be made.107
The defendant did not shape his conduct to take account of rules of
liability for negligence or of measure of damages. The ubiquitousness of
liability insurance must also be taken account of in any realistic discus-
sion of surprise. Insurance may either increase or decrease the element
of unfair surprise. Although a negligent defendant cannot reasonably
argue that he would have been more careful if he had known of the
eventual resolution of a conflict in favor of liability, it may be that he
can reasonably argue that he did not foresee any liability for his conduct
and therefore failed to take out liability insurance.08 If so, then this
107 See J.H.C. Morris, "The Proper Law of a Tort," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 895 (1951);
cf. Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1961) (refusal to make decision changing
rule of damages for wrongful death of child prospective, defendant's conduct not having
been controlled by existing law).
108 This is the basis upon which recent decisions ending long-standing immunity from
liability of charities and governments have been made prospective instead of in the traditional
retroactive form. E.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. #302, 18 Il. 2d 11,
163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (immunity of school district);
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should certainly be considered by the court. It is more likely, however,
that insurance will weaken any argument based on surprise to the
nominal defendant. If the defendant is insured, the one who will pay is
the liability insurer. It would be more in accord with the facts to speak
in terms of surprise to the insurance company. If this is done, then the
surprise argument may all but disappear. Insurance actuaries do not
base rates upon individual cases, but upon great numbers of cases." 9
That a bizarre event will occur in a given case is unlikely, but that it will
not occur in a hundred thousand cases is equally unlikely.
As for a due process argument based on surprise, there is much con-
fusion and not a little nonsense stemming largely from Learned Hand's
opinion in Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. ° In this case a New York
corporation owned an automobile. In New York, it entrusted the pos-
session of the vehicle to one of its employees. The employee drove into
Ontario where he crashed injuring the plaintiff, a passenger. The pas-
senger sued the owner. Both New York and Ontario had statutes making
the owner responsible for the negligence of someone to whom he had
entrusted his automobile. In New York, however, the owner was relieved
of responsibility if the driver violated geographical restrictions which
the owner had imposed on the authority to drive. Under Ontario law,
once having entrusted possession of the automobile to the driver, the
owner would not be relieved of liability by the driver's violation of
restrictions on his authority. The trial judge instructed the jury that if
the defendant had given possession of the automobile to the driver, it
was liable for his negligence. Judge Hand reversed the resulting verdict
and judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that the Ontario statute "could
not""' be applied to the defendant unless it were shown that the driver
was not exceeding his authority in entering Ontario." 2
Judge Hand relied for his conclusion largely upon Young v. Masci.1"
Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) (immunity of municipal
corporation); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); IKojis v.
Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961).
109 See C. R. Morris, "Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight," 70 Yale LJ. 554, 560-76 (1961). But see Ehrenzweig, "Parental Immunity in
the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement," 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 474,
477-78 (1956).
11o 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
111 Id. at 944.
112 See also O'Connor v. Wray, [1930] Can. Sup. Ct. 231, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 899 (refuses
to apply Ontario statute to Quebec owner who was not himself in Ontario although he
gave the driver of his automobile authority to drive there). But cf. Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa.
D. & C. 40 (Montgomery County Ct. 1937) (applies New Jersey absolute liability statute
to Pennsylvania dog owner whose dog bit the plaintiff in New Jersey).
It is not clear from the opinion whether judge Hand would require express or only
implied authority. See Cavers, "The Two 'Local Law' Theories," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822,
827-28 (1950).
113 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
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There a New Jersey owner had loaned his automobile in New Jersey,
without restriction on its use, to a driver who took it into New York.
The plaintiff, injured by the driver's negligence in New York, sued the
owner in New Jersey. The New Jersey courts compensated the plaintiff,
applying the New York owner's responsibility statute. The Supreme
Court affirmed, rejecting due process, equal protection, and freedom of
contract arguments.
Judge Hand's opinion in Scheer led the Minnesota Supreme Court, in
an otherwise excellent opinion, to suggest in a dictum that, even if
Wisconsin and Minnesota had similar dram shop acts, a Minnesota
bartender who served liquor in Minnesota to a drunk who caused damage
in Wisconsin could not be subjected to liability under the Wisconsin
statute absent a finding that he had "consented to be bound by Wisconsin
law.M
1 4
First of all, Young v. Masci did not hold that the owner's authorizing
the driver to drive into the state of impact was a constitutional condition
precedent to applying to the owner the owner's responsibility statute of
the state of impact. The Court very carefully pointed out that all it was
deciding was that, at least in the situation where authority was given,
there was no constitutional problem. It was not drawing a line for
future decisions." 5 Secondly, the kind of outrageous surprise necessary
for a tenable due process argument in choice-of-law problems can occur
only under two very rare circumstances. One would be the situation in
which the defendant, at the time he acted, could not reasonably have
foreseen that his conduct might create a contact with another state which
would give that state a legitimate interest in applying its rule to his
conduct-a rule different from that of the place of acting."' Siegmann v.
Meyer'1 7 might be an example of this. In Siegmann, another Hand
opinion, it was held that a New York husband who had never been in
Florida could not be held liable under Florida law for his wife's tort
there when there would be no such liability under New York law.118
Another situation which would come close to the due process line, if not
cross it, might occur between two states which had dram shop acts. Sup-
pose State X had an act which made the bartender liable only if he sold
114 Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 380, 82 N.W.2d 365, 367-68 (1957).
115 289 U.S. 253, 260.
116 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 279
(3d ed. 1949); Leflar, Conflict of Laws 212 (1959); Katzenbach, supra note 104, at 1122;
Rheinstein, "The Place of Wrong; A Study in the Method of Case Law," 19 Tul. L. Rev. 4,
31 (1944); Weintraub, "Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's
Choice of Law," 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 457-60 (1959); Note, 1958 U. Ill. L.F. 287, 295.
117 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938).
118 But cf. Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So. 2d 720 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (Mississippi father held
liable for his son's tort under Louisiana law).
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liquor to someone obviously intoxicated and that State Y imposed liability
if the liquor sold contributed in any degree to the intoxication which
caused the damage. There would be a strong constitutional argument
against holding a bartender liable under Y's statute if he had sold one
beer to a sober man in X and the man had gone elsewhere to get drunk,
finally causing damage in Y. There is no vestige of a constitutional argu-
ment, however, if both states would impose liability under the same
circumstances.
A second type of due process problem would be created if a defendant
had been required by X law to do a certain act in X and it was sought to
hold him liable under Y law for harm this act caused in Y." 9
C. Anachronism
Very often a true conflict will occur between a rule which is in step
with general modern trends in the area, and a rule which is clearly an
anachronistic lag in the development of the law of its jurisdiction. In
such circumstances, resolution should be in favor of the rule which is
more representative of current developments.' ° Usually an anachro-
nistic rule will be one preventing liability. An example would be a state's
failure to provide for actions to survive the death of a tortfeasor. Some-
times, however, there can be a current movement away from liability.
For example, the abolition of a cause of action for alienation of affections.
Justification for resolution of the conflict against the application of the
out-dated rule is particularly strong if that rule has in fact been changed
since the date of the occurrence in issue.12 1
This is not to suggest that a pseudo-conflicts analysis should be used
to avoid a poor local rule when in fact there is no true conflict, when no
other state has a legitimate interest in having its own more modern rule
applied. The temptation to use the conflicts device for this purpose may
be strong, but the only intellectually honest solution is a direct changing
of the poor local rule.
D. Unusable Foreign Procedure
Suppose the plaintiff, domiciled in F, is injured in X by the defendant,
there treated for his injuries, and, returning to F, there brings suit against
the defendant. Both F and X have rules making the defendant liable for
119 Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 202 (2d ed. 1951); Rheinstein supra note
116.
120 See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 91, at 980; Katzenbach, supra note 104, at 1125-26;
Yntema, "The Objectives of Private International Law," 35 Can. B. Rev. 721, 738 (1957).
121 But see Dalton v. McLean, 137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940) (refuses to apply expressly
retroactive survival statute of place of impact); Allen v. Nessler, 247 Minn. 230, 76 N.W.2d
793 (1956) (refuses to apply survival statute of place of impact passed since the occurrence).
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his conduct and, under these circumstances, both have a legitimate
interest in providing recovery for the plaintiff. X's procedure for award-
ing damages is, however, so unlike that followed in F, that an F court
simply cannot award the same damages as an X court would. Rigid
application of the place of impact rule will require the F court to dismiss
the plaintiff's action and remit him to whatever recovery he might have
in X.1 Under such circumstances, however, it would be better to resolve
the conflict in rules of damages in favor of F's rule. All contact jurisdic-
tions agree that the plaintiff should be compensated, disagreeing only
on the method of compensation. F should choose to apply its own
rationally applicable rule rather than send the plaintiff to sue elsewhere
-an act which may now be impractical or impossible.
E. The Foreign Choice-of-Law Rule
At times an apparent conflict may be resolved by reference to a
choice-of-law rule of one of the contact states. 8 Suppose, for example,
a husband and wife, domiciled in X, are present in Y when the wife is
injured by the husband's negligence. Under X domestic law, a wife may
sue her husband for negligence. Y, a community property state, does
not permit such a suit. Is there a real conflict? Does it make any dif-
ference where the action is brought? Without more, it is difficult to
answer these questions. Y certainly has no interest in preserving the
marital harmony of X spouses, if this is the reason for its rule. But if
Y's purpose is to prevent collusive suits, Y might legitimately apply
its own rule to a suit brought in Y. The conflict dissolves, however,
once we know that the reason for Y's domestic interdicting of wife-
husband suits is that the action belongs to the community, and Y will not
permit the husband to profit from his own wrong; that Y courts do not
consider a wife's cause of action to be community property if it arises in
Y between spouses domiciled in noncommunity property states; 124 that
122 See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d
465 (Texas Civ. App. 1953).
123 See Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 179-81 (1942); Hancock, "Three Ap-
proaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem: The Classificatory, the Functional and the Result-
Selective," in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 365, 372 n.1. (1961);
Katzenbach, supra note 104, at 1118.
124 Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956); cf. Choate v. Ransom, 74
Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958) (community property rule of marital domicile bars suit
at place of impact). But cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57 (1901) (law of place
of impact and former marital domicile applied to determine whether wife injured while
leaving to join husband at new marital domicile must join husband as manager of com-
munity); Redfern v. Collins, 113 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Tex. 1953) (law of place of impact
rather than marital domicile determines whether husband necessary party to wife's suit as
manager of the community); Traglio v. Harris, 104 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 308 U.S. 629 (1939) (law of place of impact rather than marital domicile deter-
mines whether husband has community interest in wife's cause); Astor Elec. Serv., Inc. v.
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Y, rather than fearing collusion, permits such spouses to sue one another
in Y courts.
F. How This Method Differs From a "Proper Law" Approach
Talking of choice of law for torts in terms of applying the "proper
law ' or the law of the place where there is a "grouping of contacts' '12 6
may mean many things. It may, for example, be a way of suggesting an
elimination of spurious conflicts and a rational resolution of true con-
flicts in terms of the policies underlying the putatively conflicting domestic
rules. If so, then the only disagreements the author would have would
concern matters of terminology. If, however, such terms as "proper law"
and "grouping of contacts" suggest a counting rather than an evaluation
of contacts, such a method should not be followed. A dozen contacts with
an occurrence may fail to give a state any interest in having its rule ap-
plied to determine the consequences of that occurrence. One contact may
make the policies underlying a state's rule directly and rationally appli-
cable to the event which caused that contact. Once each of two states has
a contact with an occurrence such that each has an interest in having a
different rule applied to determine controversies flowing from that
occurrence, there' is a real conflict which should be resolved by the
method suggested above, and not by simply counting contacts. 12 7
G. Illustrative Resolution of a True Conflict
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.128 will provide conflicts scholars
with material for discussion for many years to come. A New York
domiciliary boarded the defendant's airplane in New York, bound for
Boston. Defendant airline was incorporated in Massachusetts and
transacted much business in both Massachusetts and New York. The
airplane crashed in Massachusetts killing the New York passenger. His
administrator brought suit in New York. The administrator sought to
avoid the Massachusetts death act's $15,000 limit on recovery by couch-
ing his action in contract terms, the theory being that 'e defendant had
broken its implied promise to carry the decedent safely. 20 If this were a
contract and not a tort problem, the plaintiff believed that New York
Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952) (same); Maag v. Voykovich, 46 Wash. 2d 302, 280
P.2d 680 (1955) (law of place of commission determines whether husband's wrong is
a community obligation).
125 See Childres, supra note 91, at 339; J.H.C. Morris, supra note 107, at 883 (1951).
126 See Dale Sys., Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
127 See Katzenbach, supra note 104, at 1127.
128 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
129 See Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871) (in recovery for injuries to New York
citizen, damages limit of place of impact does not apply when contract of carriage made and
completed in New York).
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law would govern as either place of making, or, under the New York
view, the "center of gravity"' 30 of the transaction. The administrator's
hopes were momentarily defeated when the appellate division ordered his
contract count dismissed for insufficiency. The Court of Appeals agreed
that the contract count could not stand. The court reasoned that a con-
tract action for wrongful death is unknown at common law and that
therefore the suit must be brought under the wrongful death statute of
the place of the wrong. Then, however, in a considered dictum, the
majority declared that the $15,000 limit in the Massachusetts statute
was inapplicable. Imposition of such a limitation was contrary to New
York public policy. Moreover, the question of whether or not there
should be a limit on damages was "procedural" to be controlled by the
law of the forum.
Is the opinion an unfortunate step backward to the narrowly provincial
thinking that relied upon the epithets of "procedural" and "public policy"
to avoid applying a rule different from that of the forum? The reasoning
of the opinion leaves much to be desired, 31 but perhaps the result is
defensible and even desirable. New York certainly had an interest in
awarding adequate damages for the death of a New York citizen.182 If
damages were inadequate, the ones to suffer would be the surviving
dependents of the decedent and perhaps, ultimately, the taxpayers of
New York, if these dependents became public charges. Massachusetts,
because the wrongful death recovery is not subject to the claims of
creditors and because the decedent was not domiciled there, had no
interest in setting the damages, except the vestigial one of influencing
the conduct of a negligent tortfeasor. Massachusetts, as place of in-
corporation of the defendant and the center of its business activities
did have an interest in shielding the defendant from what it might con-
sider excessive liability. 3 ' This would not only help the defendant, but
encourage other businesses to establish and expand operations in Massa-
chusetts. To this extent, Kilberg presented a real conflict.
Was New York's discarding of the Massachusetts damages limit a
proper resolution of this conflict? No tenable argument of unfair surprise
can be made on behalf of the defendant.'84 The fatal flight originated in
New York where the defendant did extensive business. The conduct of
130 See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
131 See Currie, "Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws," 13 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 720
n.6 (1961).
132 See Comment, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1497, 1506-07 (1961).
133 See Currie & Schreter, "Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 47 (1960); Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1652, 1654
(1961).
134 See Comment, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1497, 1510 (1961).
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the defendant was not shaped in any way by the damages rules of New
York or Massachusetts. Nor would the rejection of the limitation on
damages in this case be likely to upset the actuarial practices of de-
fendant's insurer or of defendant as self-insurer. Application of the
limitation would have, to the extent actual damages exceeded the low
statutory ceiling, resulted in concentration of the loss on the estate and
surviving dependents of the decedent. Rejection of the limitation per-
mitted distribution of the insurable risk. It is true that the decedent
himself could have distributed the risk of financial harm from his injury
or death by taking out accident and life insurance. The cost of shifting
or distributing a risk created by an industry should, however, be borne
in the first instance by that industry as a cost of doing business. The
Kilberg result was socially desirable and in keeping with the inexorable
trend of the law of torts toward distribution rather than concentration
of losses. 385
Can it be that such a desirable result is precluded by the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution?.3 That it is so precluded
was suggested by the concurring opinion in Kilberg,l37 citing Hughes v.
Fetter.'8" The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has now wrestled
with this constitutional problem twice, in an opinion by a three-judge
panel and again in a rehearing en banc. The three-judge panel, in
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,'13 9 a case arising from the same crash
involved in Kilberg, held, two to one, that full faith and credit to the
Massachusetts death act prevents a federal court sitting in New York
from following the Kilberg dictum. Then, after a rehearing en banc, the
court, six to three, rejected both due process and full faith and credit
objections to refusal to apply the damage limitation of the Massachusetts
statute. 4 o
Although a detailed tracing of the complex development of due process
and full faith and credit limitations on a state's choice of law is beyond
the scope of this article,' an appraisal of the full faith and credit ob-
185 On the issue of application of the place of impact's limitation, contra, Maynard v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949); cf. Zirkelbach v. Decatur Cartage Co.,
119 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Ind. 1954) (damages limitation of decedent's domicile does not
apply when impact elsewhere); Davenport v. Webb, 15 App. Div. 2d 42, 222 N.Y.S.2d 566
(1st Dep't 1961), aff'd 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962) (Kilberg not
applicable to interest on damages).
136 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
137 9 N.Y.2d 34, 51, 172 N.E.2d 526, 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 146 (1961).
138 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
139 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
140 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). The court also held that damages were to be measured
by New York's Lord Campbell's type statute and not by degree of culpability as provided
in the Massachusetts act.
141 See Weintraub, supra note 116.
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jections raised in Judge Swan's majority opinion for the three-judge
panel, and in Judge Friendly's dissenting en banc opinion, is called for.
Judge Swan's majority opinion rests heavily upon Hughes v. Fetter'4
which held it a violation of the full faith and credit requirement for
Wisconsin to refuse to provide a forum for a wrongful death action
involving Wisconsin parties and brought under the Illinois death act.
The reasoning in Hughes was that Wisconsin had no policy against
wrongful death actions since Wisconsin itself had a wrongful death
statute. The full faith and credit standard articulated in Hughes and
quoted in Pearson consists of weighing the need for a nationally uniform
result under the Illinois statute against the interest of Wisconsin in
denying a forum. Wisconsin, in the eyes of the majority in Hughes,
had no legitimate forum-closing interest and therefore "the strong
unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause'1 43
prevailed. It is submitted that in the context of Kilberg and Pearson,
New York's substantial interests are not outweighed by a need for a
nationally uniform result under the damage limitation provision of the
Massachusetts statute. Moreover, in Hughes itself there is a strong
indication that if Wisconsin had elected to apply its own death act instead
of closing its forum to a suit under the Illinois act, there would have
been no constitutional objection:
The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having entertained appel-
lant's lawsuit, chose to apply its own instead of Illinois' statute to measure
the substantive rights involved. This distinguishes the present case from
those where we have said that "Prima facie every state is entitled to en-
force in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted."' 44
Judge Friendly's dissent is quite another matter. He concedes that,
on the facts in Pearson, New York could apply its own wrongful death
act without violating the requirements of full faith and credit. But New
York cannot, he says, do what the court in Kilberg did-utilize the
Massachusetts statute as the basis for the cause of action and then
refuse to apply a damage limitation which is a key provision of that
very Massachusetts statute.
The increasing scope of statutory liabilities makes it particularly vital that
lawmakers of one state should know that once a transitory right has been
created by them, it will receive the uniform enforcement from other states
which the Full Faith and Credit Clause contemplated ... and that they
should not be obliged to speculate that other states may take what is
liked and reject what is disliked-a prospect that might well discourage
or prevent enactments otherwise deemed desirable. 145
142 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
143 Id. at 612.
144 Id. at 612 n.l0.
145 Supra note 140, at 566.
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In view of the national-versus-state-interest weighing standard which is
the essence of full faith and credit, it may be doubted whether, if New
York could have substituted its law for that of Massachusetts in toto,
there is any greater objection to New York's applying Massachusetts
law generally and substituting New York law only on those issues where
New York's interest and policies are strongest and most opposed to
those of Massachusetts. Even conceding Judge Friendly's full faith and
credit objections to Kilberg, however, it should be noted that those
objections are not addressed to resolution of the conflict of laws in favor
of New York law, as suggested herein. Judge Friendly instead objects
to the same reasoning as was adversely criticized above in discussing
Kilberg. Any disagreement on this point is simply over whether these
objections are of constitutional dignity.
H. How a Policy-Centered Approach Helps Avoid the Tyranny of
Characterization
The Kilberg case epitomizes the import role of characterization in
the traditional, rigid, territorially oriented method for choice of law. If
we have one choice-of-law rule for "torts" problems and a different one
for "contracts" problems," 6 the result may well turn upon the label
affixed to the case in the first step of analysis, or in subsequent steps
when defining contact words in the choice-of-law rule or in deciding what
146 See Bittner v. Little, 270 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1959) (effect of release of concurrent
tortfeasor) ; Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952) (whether damages under
Federal Tort Claims Act governed by collateral source rule of place of impact or place
of performance of employment contract); Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 178 F.2d
139 (2d Cir. 1949) (limitation on wrongful death recovery); Southwestern Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1949) (contribution); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 43 (D.NJ. 1957) (liability of insurer); Preine v. Freeman,
112 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1953) (release of joint tortfeasors); Williamson v. Massachu-
setts Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 573, 116 A.2d 169 (1955) (liability of insurer);
Pittsburg, C., C. & S.L. Ry. v. Groin, 142 Ky. 51, 133 S.W. 977 (1911) (duty of carrier);
Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958) (release of successive tortfeasors);
Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871) (carrier's duty to passenger); De Bono v. Bittner,
13 Misc. 2d 333, 178 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd mem., 10 App. Div. 2d
556, 196 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't 1960) (release of concurrent tortfeasor); Heinemann v.
Jewish Agricultural Soc'y, 178 Misc. 897, 37 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua 1942),
aff'd mem., 266 App. Div. 907, 43 N.Y.S.2d 746, motion for leave to appeal denied, 266
App. Div. 941, 46 N.YS.2d 219 (4th Dep't), motion for leave to appeal granted, 291 N.Y.
828, 51 N.E.2d 698 (1943) (duty of charity); Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa.
322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951) (contribution); Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d
606 (1942) (release of joint tortfeasor); Wojduk v. U.S. Rubber Co, 13 Wis. 2d 173,
108 N.W.2d 149 (1961) (warranty issues governed by different law than negligence issues);
Leflar, "Conflict of Laws," in 1961 Ann. Survey Am. L. 29, 41-48 (1962) ("Contracts and
Torts" a single topic); Shuman & Prevezer, "Torts in English and American Conflict of
Laws: The Role of The Forum," 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1067, 1117 (1958) (greater damages may
be reason for electing tort rather -than contract theory); see also Lister v. McAnulty,
[1944] Can. Sup. Ct. 317, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 673 (damages for loss of consortium a matter
of "status" to be governed by law of marital domicile) ; Harper, "Tort Cases in the Conflict
of Laws," 33 Can. B. Rev. 1155, 1165 (1955) (conversion--situs of goods or place of
wrong).
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is "procedural" and what "substantive." It is true that the possibility
of changing the result by changing the label has introduced a certain
flexibility into the traditional system and has at times permitted a per-
ceptive court to avoid what seemed to be an unwise requirement of that
system. It would be better, however, to reach such just results rationally
and consistently rather than haphazardly and by a seemingly arbitrary
switching of labels.
In the first step of the method here suggested, identifying and eliminat-
ing spurious conflicts, such labels are largely irrelevant. The focus is
directly on the two rules in apparent conflict and their underlying
policies. In the second step, a rational resolution of a true conflict
primarily by attention to the policies underlying the substantive area
involved, it is true that characterization problems may again appear in
defining that substantive area. It is far less likely, however, that such
general and pervasive policies will point to different results than that
the narrow domestic rules of two states on a particular issue will do so.
I. A Choice-of-Law Rule Suggested by These Concepts
Insight into the nature of the problems to be solved is of far greater
significance in reaching sensible solutions than is the method of artic-
ulating a particular rule for solution. Nevertheless, the statement of a
rule to be applied is certainly important. The following rule is suggested
as a shorthand statement of all that has been said above: An actor is
liable for his conduct if he is liable under the law of any state whose
interests would be advanced significantly by imposing liability, unless
imposition of liability would unfairly surprise the actor.'
III. IF THERE is No RATIONAL BASIS FOR PREFERRING ONE CON-
FLICTING POLICY OVER THE OTHER, WEIGH THE DESIRABILITY OF GIVING
ABSOLUTE PREFERENCE TO THE FORUM POLICY AGAINST THE DESIR-
ABILITY OF INSULATING THE RESULT FROM THE
SELECTION OF THE FORUM
If no rational basis appears for resolving a true conflict, the forum
rule should still not be applied as a matter of course. Although the
forum has a rationally applicable rule, although this rule conflicts with
147 Cf. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 345 (1949) (which-
ever rule is most favorable to the plaintiff); Ehrenzweig, "The Place of Acting in Inten-
tional Multistate Torts: Laws and Reason Versus the Restatement," 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
5 (1951) (liable for intentional tort if liable under either law of place of conduct or of
place of harm); Kuratowski, "Torts in Private International Law," I Int'l L.Q. 172, 182
(1947) (discusses German doctrine permitting the plaintiff to select the law of any country
with which the occurrence is connected) ; Rheinstein, supra note 116, at 30 (allow plaintiff
to shop for most favorable forum).
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a rationally applicable rule of another state, and although the forum
is unable to resolve this conflict by reference to the general policies and
trends of the law of torts, the forum may be able to find a solution sug-
gested by a general policy of the conflict of laws itself. This policy is
the insulation of the result from the selection of the forum. Depending
upon the strength of the local policy involved, the forum may determine
that it prefers to make the result independent of forum selection rather
than simply fall back upon the forum law.
One situation in which a decision in favor of uniformity of result should
always be made is that in which neither the forum's rule nor the rule
of the other contact state is, in terms of underlying policy, applicable to
the case at bar, but one rule or the other must be chosen as a rule for
decision. For example, the plaintiff, domiciled in State X, is injured in X
in a collision between his automobile and one driven by the defendant.
The defendant, domiciled in State Y, dies. The plaintiff brings suit
against the defendant's estate in Y. Under Y law, tort claims survive
the death of the tortfeasor. Under X law, they do not. Under these
circumstances, neither X nor Y has a contact with the parties or with
the collision which would make applicable the policies underlying its
rule on survival. The desirability of insulating the result from the
selection of the forum outweighs the desirability of giving absolute
preference to the forum policy, a policy which is not even logically
applicable. 14
8
IV. INSULATE THE RESULT FROM THE SELECTION OF THE FORUm IF
THIS is POSSIBLE. OTHERWISE, APPLY THE FoRum's RULE
One method of providing for uniformity of result, no matter in which
contact state the case is litigated, is to apply a choice-of-law rule. Any
choice-of-law rule which is uniformly interpreted and applied will satisfy
the goal of uniformity, but the rub is that it must be uniformly inter-
preted and applied. Failure to take account of the fact that the jurisdic-
tion indicated by the choice-of-law rule would reach a result other than
that stated in its domestic law will defeat an attempt to make the result
independent of forum selection.
Even a choice-of-law rule designed to encourage uniform interpretation
and application, and backstopped with a reference to the whole law of
the indicated jurisdiction, will fail to achieve uniformity in at least one
situation in which uniformity might otherwise be achieved. This is when
the forum's choice-of-law rule points to the forum, but the foreign state's
148 But see Currie, "Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 232 (1958) (advocating application of forum law).
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choice-of-law rule does not. When, having exhausted the possibility of
resolving a true conflict of laws on a substantive level, the sole remaining
conflicts purpose is to insulate the result from the selection of the forum,
the forum should immediately place itself in the position of a court in the
foreign state having a contact with the parties or with the occurrence
and decide the matter exactly as the foreign court would have decided
the case at bar.149
There are two circumstances in which the forum will not be able to
achieve uniformity of result with all states having contacts with the
parties or with the occurrence by placing itself in the position of the
foreign court. The first situation is that in which there is only one foreign
jurisdiction having a contact with the case, but its court would insist on
adjudicating the case exactly as the forum court. This will result in an
endless circle of references between forum and foreign court. 1 0 This
impasse can be escaped if, as between forum and foreign jurisdiction,
one is clearly the more natural or probable forum. The forum should
apply the domestic rule of the jurisdiction having contact with the parties
or with the occurrence which is the more probable forum.' 5 ' Since the
foreign court is conforming to the forum's method of adjudication, if the
foreign court accepts the forum's characterization of the natural forum,
it will apply the same domestic law as is applied by the forum. If, how-
ever, it is not clear which is the natural forum and the foreign court's
characterization of "natural forum" differs from that of the forum's,
uniformity cannot be achieved. Similarly, uniformity cannot be achieved
if neither contact state can realistically be characterized as the more
natural forum.
. The second situation in which uniformity is not possible is that in
which there is more than one foreign jurisdiction having a contact with
the case and in which the foreign courts have differing choice-of-law rules
and would not be willing to conform to the forum's adjudication.
If uniformity is the sole remaining conflicts goal and this goal cannot
be reached, there is no useful purpose which can be achieved by -apply-
ing a domestic rule other than that of the forum. 5 Applying the forum's
domestic rule will provide a rule for decision and will be convenient for
forum judges and lawyers. The forum's domestic rule should be applied
if the forum has sufficient contact with the parties or with the occurrence
149 Cf. Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc. 1017, 1020, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
County 1950); Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
150 See Weintraub, "Conflicting Choice-of-Law Rules," 43 Iowa L. Rev. 519, 524 (1958).
151 See Freund, "Characterization with Respect to Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," in
The Conflict of Laws and International Contracts 158, 161 (1951).
152 See Harper, "Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Pro-
fessor Lorenzen's Essays," 56 Yale LJ. 1155, 1174-75 (1947).
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to keep use of the forum's rule within the bounds of reason. If the
forum does not have such a contact, it should select, from a jurisdiction
which does, the foreign rule most similar to that of the forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The plea for a method of solving conflicts problems which is primarily
concerned with the policies underlying putatively conflicting domestic
rules and with the more general purposes and trends in the substantive
area involved-such a plea is not that of a lone voice in the wilderness.
Scholars of the first rank have been talking of such things for many
years. More significantly for today, judges, led by Roger Traynor of
California, are more and more applying such a method to the decision
of conflicts cases. Now, the Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized this case development by interpreting the language of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, "under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,"' a to mean the
whole law of that place, including its conflict of law rules. 54 The main
reason given by the Court for this interpretation is to permit the federal
courts to utilize the flexibility and rationality which state courts are
more and more introducing into a system formerly rigid and irrational.
The last battle has not been fought, but the war has been won.
153 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
154 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
